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REMARKS:  
I’m a sociologist, not a lawyer, so I’m going to talk 
to you as a sociologist but I will make references to the 
law.  I’ll give you a synopsis of our understanding of the 
Arab Spring.  The Arab Spring is, in essence, a grassroots 
outcry and movement for social justice.  The reason why it 
didn’t stay limited to Tunisia, but spread throughout the 
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Middle East and North Africa, is that this cry reflected 
deeper trends and grievances that included, most 
importantly, the notion of patrilineal succession in what I 
call republican monarchies. These are, basically, republican 
dictators acting as if they were monarchs ready to hand 
power over to their sons. Another reason is because of 
conspicuous corruption.  Not just corruption, which is 
widespread anyway, but corruption in a very conspicuous 
way, especially by the sons of these dictators and their 
friends and cronies, which is visible to all.  And finally, the 
lack of opportunity and the lack of upward social mobility, 
especially in a situation where you have a youth bulge. All 
of these factors combined created this outcry, which started 
in Tunisia.  Because it was so quick there and so 
successful, it was able to spread very quickly to other 
places.  Middle class youth and professionals who used 
social media to organize and mobilize led it initially. 
   The big drawback of this movement is that the 
participants refused to organize.  They were willing to join 
together and come out into the squares and the streets to 
protest but they resisted the notion of self-organization and 
leadership.  This meant that over time, which didn’t take 
long actually, they were overshadowed by political parties 
that took advantage of the vacuum that had been created.  
These parties had been there all along but had been 
suppressed or illegal, or were lying low, and they were very 
well organized.  The main group was the Muslim 
Brotherhood, which is a Sunni Islamist movement that is 
politically moderate but socially conservative.  They are as 
extreme as Obama is an extreme Christian, which is not at 
all; or Romney, for that matter.  Among Islamists, they are 
moderates.  In addition to their rise, there were other parties 
that also took advantage of what were essentially a free-for-
all and a vacuum after the fall of some these dictators, 
including more radical, fundamentalist groups, like the 
Salafis. 
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 The main challenge that these parties, which are 
coming to power through elections, face is solving the very 
deep economic crisis that exists throughout the region, 
especially in North Africa.  The problem is that these 
parties have no experience in governance.  They don’t have 
the capacity and they don’t have the tools to address this 
very deep economic crisis.  So it is very likely – and we 
should look at this on a case-by-case basis, because each 
country is going to be a little bit different – that the future 
will bring either a descent into chaos, which hopefully will 
not happen but is certainly a possibility, or a new trend 
towards authoritarianism.  The only way to keep people on 
board and quiescent is to create new forms of 
authoritarianism.  Of course, people have now found their 
voice, but the problems, which are very deep, are not being 
resolved.  As such, the people are going to make claims 
that the state will not be able to satisfy.  In addition, we 
have had elections in many places and now we are facing 
constitutional battles in Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, and possibly 
Yemen.   
 
 As these events took place, when the first dictator 
fell and then the second, the third dictator said, “Hey, wait 
a minute.  This is not going my way.”  This was Qadhafi, 
and unfortunately for him, he ended up on the side of the 
ledger with the ex-dictators, or as a dead dictator in his 
case.  Another one, Ali Abdullah Saleh in Yemen, also 
ended up an ex-dictator.  But the remaining ones, with 
Qadhafi first, put up a fight. Qadhafi lost because of the 
combination of popular uprising and military intervention, 
and the other dictators learned the lesson, especially the 
next one in line: the leader of Syria, Bashar al-Assad. They 
did everything in their power to head off popular uprisings 
in their countries. This included the region’s monarchs, 
who have been handing over power to their sons for 
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generations. Their populations have generally accepted this.  
Yet these monarchies have the same socio-economic 
problems and same issues of social injustice and corruption 
that we saw in the republican states.  They include Jordan, 
Morocco, and the Gulf monarchies. Some of the latter are 
immensely wealthy and therefore can buy off their own 
people more easily than the relatively poor states in North 
Africa. 
 
 When the surviving regimes realized that they 
might be next they decided to sow discord, which was the 
easiest thing to do.  They set people up against each other.  
How?  By pushing certain buttons.  The most important 
button was the sectarian one.  So they said about a certain 
group, “Those people are Shia and they want to gain power, 
and you as Sunnis, you should help us resist them, or civil 
war and chaos will ensue.”  They said this very explicitly 
and it worked like a song.  It worked in Bahrain and it 
worked in Syria.  The result in Bahrain has been a kind of 
stalemate: the regime remains very strong and enjoys the 
regional support from Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf 
states. In Syria, the result has been civil war – the regime’s 
threat come true.   
 
 The rise of sectarianism must be understood in the 
context of a larger regional struggle between Sunni-
dominated and Shia-dominated states, but also between 
Iran and the Arab world.  Iran is a predominantly Shia 
country and the Arab states are mostly Sunni, some with 
substantial Shia minorities, or even a majority.  For 
example, Iraq has a Shia majority, as does Lebanon and 
Bahrain.  So the Arab world is actually divided between 
Sunni and Shia.  Many of the Sunnis consider Shias as 
proxies for Iran.  There is a political cold war between Iran 
and the Arab world, but it takes sectarian overtones. This is 
very dangerous and destructive.   
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 You will also see that some of the stronger states, 
Iran on one side and Saudi Arabia, the Gulf states, and 
Turkey – the Sunni states – on the other, are fighting this 
cold war in the territory of the weaker states, such as 
Palestine, Lebanon, Iraq, Bahrain, and Yemen.  The 
question is: Is this like the old cold war between the super 
powers, where there were hot conflicts fought by proxies in 
other places, or are we going to see some kind of 
stalemate?  That is the big question with regard to the 
Syrian civil war.   
 
 Finally, on United States (U.S.) policy, the Obama 
administration has been essentially bewildered and 
perplexed, not knowing how really to respond, because 
these events are out of the administration’s control.  This 
was the first time where, at mass protests in the Arab street, 
you didn’t hear the slogan “Down with the U.S.”  The fact 
that the U.S. was irrelevant is very interesting.  It meant 
that, in a way, President Obama had a free pass at first, but 
also that he had to keep a low profile and play things very 
carefully in order to take advantage of the Arab Spring so 
that, in the end, the U.S. would find itself “on the right side 
of history.”  As such, essentially de facto, the U.S. chose 
the side of the new powers-that-be, primarily the Muslim 
Brotherhood, in the countries that have undergone a 
democratic transition.  You won’t find the administration 
saying this explicitly, but that is what is happening.  
 
 Now we find the U.S. suddenly with new allies who 
used to be persona-non-grata. As a U.S. official, you used 
to generally not be able, or allowed, to speak to the Muslim 
Brotherhood.  Perhaps low-level diplomats could contact 
them but you definitely were not able to have open 
relations with this group.  Now this has changed 
dramatically. At the same time, old allies have become 
intensely embarrassing.  One example of this is the Bahrain 
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monarchy, which has undertaken a series of highly 
repressive measures against its Shia population. Even the 
U.S. says this is the wrong thing to do, but at the same 
time, the Obama administration recognizes Bahrain is a 
strong and strategic ally, and so they reason, “We have a lot 
of military assets there, we face an Iranian enemy across 
the Gulf, so what can we do?”   
 By contract, in Syria the U.S. has placed itself on 
the side of the rebels who are trying to overthrow Bashar 
al-Assad. Some of these have a jihadist agenda and are 
somehow affiliated with al-Qaeda or feel an affinity 
towards al-Qaeda.  The U.S. has found itself de facto on 
their side because it is against the regime and wants it to 
fall.  The U.S. cannot really pick and choose in this 
confusing and fluid environment of multiple groups 
seeking to topple the regime.  It cannot really control where 
weapons go and so de facto it is reinforcing radical groups 
that are strongest because they are so particularly violent 
and brutal. These groups could prevail in the end and 
impose their own post-regime political agenda in Syria, 
regardless of what the U.S. might wish.  We thus could find 
ourselves in a situation similar to that of the Mujahedeen in 
Afghanistan in the 1980s, when the U.S. helped create al-
Qaeda in the first place. This would indeed be a very 
unfortunate outcome of the Arab Spring. 
 
 
 
